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Abstract
This paper introduces a model framework for dynamic credit rating processes. Our frame-
work aggregates ordinal rating information stemming from a variety of rating sources. The dy-
namic of the consensus rating captures systematic as well as idiosyncratic changes. In addition,
our framework allows to validate the different rating sources by analyzing the mean/variance
structure of the rating deviations.
In an empirical study for the iTraxx Europe companies rated by the big three external
rating agencies we use Bayesian techniques to estimate the consensus ratings for these com-
panies. The advantages are illustrated by comparing our dynamic rating model to a na¨ıve
benchmark model.
Keywords: Bayesian estimation, consensus information, credit ratings, external rating agencies, rating
validation.
1
1 Introduction
The importance of credit ratings provided by the big three external rating agencies Standard&Poor’s,
Moody’s and Fitch has increased because modern credit risk pricing requires individual risk parameters,
like rating implied probabilities of default (PDs; Kliger and Sarig, 2000). Despite the fact that all
three raters express forward-looking opinions about the creditworthiness of firms on an ordinal scale,
their ratings are rather incomparable because different rating systems with different granularity as well
as different labels (typically, a combination of letters, numbers and/or modifiers). Nevertheless, the
agencies consider the likelihood of default to be a centerpiece of creditworthiness and therefore consistent
with the goal of an ordinal rating scale, where firms with a lower rating should have a higher PD than
firms with a higher rating (e.g., Cantor and Packer, 1997). Obviously, the raters do not always agree
on the creditworthiness of the firms (e.g., Cantor and Packer, 1995; Jewell and Livingston, 2002). This
resulting rating heterogeneity raises questions regarding the (1) nature, (2) quality and (3) interpretation
of the ratings and the corresponding PDs. Are there consistent differences in their rating behavior? Does
one agency have somewhat better information than the others regarding the creditworthiness? Or, does
the rating heterogeneity just evince the very subjective and probabilistic nature of ratings (Ederington,
1986)? Along with different definitions of ratings, do they measure different quantities representing
the creditworthiness? Hence, rating heterogeneity nourishes the hypothesis that the rating processes of
the agencies are not absolute and the differences in the published ratings may be a result of different
sources of information, of different opinions about the obligors or of different discriminative focuses in
the rating process, e.g., one agency might give more weight to the balance sheet leverage than the other.
In addition, unsystematic or random errors may occur in a rating process. Cantor and Packer (1997)
assess the problem whether observed rating heterogeneity reflects different rating scales or is simply the
result of selection bias. Morgan (2002) analyzes the occurrence of split ratings and finds that split ratings
are more frequent in the banking and insurance industry than in other industries. Lo¨ffler (2004) uses a
structural model of default to derive rating characteristics if ratings are meant to give through the cycle
evaluations as opposed to being based on the borrower’s current condition only.
There is a growing literature on the analysis of credit ratings as well as their providers in the context of
validation, regulation and information of the credit market (Moon and Stotsky, 1993; Cantor and Packer,
1995; Krahnen and Weber, 2001; Jewell and Livingston, 2002; Altman and Rijken, 2004; Stolper, 2009),
but to the best of our knowledge there is no literature discussing how to combine different (heterogeneous)
ratings of a company into a common rating. Especially in the area of financial modeling, where ratings
play an inevitable role, it is essential to be able to deal with rating heterogeneity. For example, ratings
serve as input parameters in industry models, e.g., CreditMetrics, and they are used for regulatory issues,
like in the Basel II framework (see Bank for International Settlements, 2004). Treacy and Carey (2000)
present the internal rating systems in use at the 50 largest US banking organizations. They state that
“US regulatory agencies already use internal ratings in supervision” (see Treacy and Carey, 2000, p. 168).
A further example is the European Central Bank which extends collateralized loans to European banks.
The decision whether to accept a collateral or not is mainly based on agency ratings and – if available
– reported internal ratings which have to be aggregated. All these needs to validate and extend existing
rating systems require to be able to cope with rating heterogeneity in order to combine ordinal ratings
from different sources. Our framework addresses these needs.
In order to aggregate information of different raters a measure of “consensus” is required. Zarnowitz
and Lamnros (1987) define “consensus” as the degree of agreement among point predictions aimed at
the same target by different individuals. It can be computed as the median (Su and Su, 1975) or the
mean of all the predictions in the sample (Zarnowitz and Lamnros, 1987). Alternative strategies for the
aggregation of predictions are discussed by Cook and Seiford (1982); Schnader and Stekler (1991) and
Kolb and Stekler (1996). In the context of forecasting the PDs of individual firms, Hornik et al. (2010) use
a static mixed-effects model (Pinheiro and Bates, 2000) to model the consensus PDs with rater-specific
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fixed effects and a random effect for firms. They refer to their proposed approach as the latent trait
model.
The aim of this paper is to solve the information problem of combining different rating information
stemming from different rating sources by deriving appropriate consensus information, i.e., consensus
ratings which incorporate the information of several rating sources. Our approach takes the perspective
of a rating user, i.e., an investor or financial regulator, where the respective decision making process has
to deal with the existence of split ratings as opposed to the perspective of the rated firms (see Bongaerts
et al., 2012). In a non-technical sense, any aggregation method has to solve two fundamental problems:
(i) What is the common economic meaning of the ratings that have to be aggregated? (ii) How can the
information be aggregated given the ratings are measured only on an ordinal scale? Our approach aims
at aggregating the information concerning the PD of the rated entity. We solve the problem of ordinal
information by modeling an underlying metric variable of creditworthiness which can be inferred from
observed ordinal ratings. The consensus rating is then derived in a way fully consistent with the assumed
model.
We claim that from a general point of view any suitable constructed consensus rating is more in-
formative than the use of a single rating source. Ratings solve an information problem. Each rating
agency uses certain information which might only be available to this rating agency and derives a rat-
ing without disclosing the specific information used to the public at large. The published rating is an
estimate about the creditworthiness of the underlying conditional on the private information provided to
the rating agency. Different raters in general have access to different sources of private information. In
estimating a consensus rating, the ideal approach would be to pool all these sets of private information
into one information set and estimate a rating based on the complete information. However, this is not
possible because only the published ratings are available. Thus, if only ratings but not the underlying
information sets are available the best choice is to derive a consensus measure based on the published
ratings. Such a measure incorporates the different information sets indirectly via the published ratings
and therefore is more informative.
We show that our method to construct a consensus rating is superior to a na¨ıve “benchmark” model.
Based on a transformation of ordinal ratings into metric variables one could easily construct a “simple
consensus rating” by taking the arithmetic mean of the transformed values. The main advantage of
our approach compared to this na¨ıve benchmark model is that it accounts for cases where only ratings
from different subsets of raters are available and that it is based on a consistent framework by modeling
the underlying data-generating process. Lacking such a framework any na¨ıve averaging is very likely to
produce biased estimates given rater-specific differences in rating behavior. The empirical results using
statistical information criteria presented in this paper support this claim. In addition, based on the
consensus ratings and the rating deviations, we assess the precision and the agreement of the different
rating sources which may serve as the basis for validating different rating systems. But also from a purely
economic perspective our proposed consensus model outperforms the na¨ıve averaging model: due to the
ability to handle missing ratings appropriately, the proposed consensus model captures the companies’
conflicts of purchasing only the most favorable ratings (see Bolton et al., 2012). Furthermore, in pricing
complex financial products ratings are inevitable. As mentioned, many financial decisions are based on
creditworthiness estimates and inappropriate handling of rating heterogeneity does not make matters
easier.
The model framework presented in this paper is related to other studies on credit rating systems
(e.g., McNeil and Wendin, 2007; Stefanescu et al., 2009; Hornik et al., 2010). In contrast to Hornik et al.
(2010) our model framework estimates the consensus rating on an ordinal scale and in a dynamic way.
In addition, we make use of a latent market variable, describing the overall level of “creditworthiness”,
which induces a correlation structure between the estimated consensus ratings. This is a well accepted
strategy in the credit risk literature (e.g., Nickell et al., 2000; McNeil and Wendin, 2006, 2007; Stefanescu
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et al., 2009). Therefore we refer to our model setup as the dynamic latent trait model.
In order to illustrate the potential of our dynamic model framework, we apply it to the iTraxx Europe
(Series 10) companies rated by the big three external rating agencies. In particular, we use all available
ordinal rating information of these companies by the three raters over a time period from 2007-02 to
2009-01. Using these data, we estimate the consensus ratings and analyze the three raters according to
their rating deviations and their agreement with the consensus ratings.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model specification
and estimation of the consensus ratings. In Section 2.1 we discuss our dynamic latent trait model and
Section 2.2 explains the benchmark approach which is used to validate our dynamic model. Section 3
provides a data description of the iTraxx Europe (Series 10) index and the agency ratings of the firms
within this index. Section 4 applies the models described in Section 2 to the data. Bayesian estimation
techniques are used to estimate the parameters of interest. The benchmark as well as the dynamic model
are fitted to the data. The appropriateness of the dynamic model is confirmed by the deviance information
criterion (DIC; Spiegelhalter et al., 2002). Section 5 concludes and summarizes the main results and the
implications of our framework.
2 Consensus modeling
In this section we develop a model framework to derive consensus ratings from raters providing ordi-
nal rating information, e.g., external agency ratings. Our model is designed for a dynamic framework
capturing a time dependent rating process. Despite the fact that the raters publish ordinal ratings, we
assume that they estimate a numerical variable – representing the creditworthiness of the firm – in an
internal rating process. Each firm is then assigned to a particular rating class if this variable lies within
a certain interval (e.g., McNeil and Wendin, 2007; Stefanescu et al., 2009). In general, the specific rat-
ing process including for example the estimation method is unknown. In the literature, modeling the
creditworthiness was first discussed by Altman (1968) who introduces the Z-score. Z-scores are used to
predict corporate defaults and are an easy-to-calculate control measure for the financial distress status of
companies. The Z-score uses multiple corporate income and balance sheet values to measure the financial
health of a company. Furthermore, Merton (1974) assumes that the creditworthiness can be reflected
by the distance-to-default (DD) capturing the distance of the firm’s asset value to its default threshold
on the real line. Alternatively, the creditworthiness variable can also be the result of an ordered probit
or logit regression model (e.g., Altman and Rijken, 2004). To obtain ordinal ratings, the estimated DD,
the Z-score, or any other numerical variable representing the creditworthiness – which is in the following
referred to as “rating score” – is mapped onto an ordinal rating scale by the raters.
Let {1, . . . ,Kj} be the set of possible non-default rating classes of rater j in descending creditwor-
thiness. That is, 1 denotes the best credit quality and Kj the worst non-default rating class of rater j.
Further, Sij(t) denotes the estimated rating score (e.g., negative DD, Z-score) and rij(t) the associated
observed ordinal rating of firm i by rater j at time t. The relationship between rij(t) and Sij(t) is given
by
rij(t) = k ⇔ Sij(t) ∈ [λk−1,j , λk,j), (1)
for a monotonically increasing sequence λk,j with k = 0, . . . ,Kj . The class boundaries are assumed to
be constant over time. The data consists of observations for J raters, T time points and I companies.
Observing rating k for a firm by rater j means that its rating score lies somewhere in the interval
[λk−1,j , λk,j).
In general, the thresholds λk,j are not provided by the raters. One possibility to obtain λk,j is to
relate the ratings to the observable empirical default rates. In particular, the thresholds can be computed
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by using the empirical default rates on an appropriate scale1. Assuming that the scores of empirical
default rates, Sij(t), are defined on the real line we have to fix the lower as well as the upper threshold
(λ0,j = −∞ and λKj ,j = +∞, respectively). The length of the intervals need not be equal and may differ
from rater to rater. Nevertheless, it is expected that firms within the same interval will exhibit roughly
the same creditworthiness (Stefanescu et al., 2009).
Due to general informational asymmetry between firm owners and raters2 which can be due to limited
access to the existing information, such as incomplete accounting information (Duffie and Lando, 2001),
or delayed observations of the driving risk factors (Guo et al., 2008) the raters cannot estimate the “true”
score (reflecting the creditworthiness) of a firm. Assuming that the rating deviations can be modeled
additively3 the relationship between the estimated rating score Sij(t) and the latent score Si(t) on the
score scale is given by
Sij(t) = Si(t) + ǫij(t), (2)
where ǫij(t) denotes the rating deviation for firm i by rater j at time t. In the following, the latent score
Si(t) is also referred to as the consensus score.
On the right hand side of Equation (2) we find two terms, which have to be specified: (1) The latent
score Si(t) which describes the consensus creditworthiness and (2) the deviation term ǫij(t) which captures
the bias as well as the accuracy of the rating system of a specific rater. In the following those terms are
specified for both the dynamic latent trait model and the benchmark approach.
Despite the fact that the scores Sij(t) are unknown, the latent scores Si(t) and the bias/variance
structure of the rating deviations can be estimated in our framework by specifying the distribution of
the rating deviations and using the interval thresholds λ·,j along with the relationship of Equation (1).
The estimated consensus scores Si(t) can then be mapped on the rater-specific ordinal scale to derive
the consensus ratings r∗ij(t) which obviously depend on the used rating system (of rater j). Since rij(t)
and r∗ij(t) for all i and j are on the same rating scale one can easily compare these ratings and derive
inference about the quality of the observed ratings rij(t).
2.1 Dynamic latent trait model
Latent consensus score. In order to specify the latent scores Si(t), we follow the lines of McNeil
and Wendin (2007) and Stefanescu et al. (2009) and assume that the scores are driven by market-
specific (systematic risk) as well as firm-specific effects (idiosyncratic risk). We define a time-dependent
processmi(t) capturing the idiosyncratic changes and a latent market factor f(t) capturing the systematic
development of the latent scores Si(t). The idiosyncratic changesmi(t) track the firm-specific risk and can
be modeled as an adequate time series process to cope with repeated observations. The latent market f(t),
modeling the development of the market, implies a correlation structure between the different firms and
can also be modeled by an adequate time-dependent process, e.g., a stationary auto-regressive process or
a random walk. Let νi be the long-term mean of firm i which can be interpreted as the historical average
creditworthiness of the firm. The development of the latent scores Si(t) on the score scale is given by
Si(t) = νi +mi(t) + αf(t), (3)
where the factor loading α captures the dependence of Si(t) on f(t).
1Beside this, we assume that raters do not change their rating technology during the desired time period, i.e, they are
always measuring creditworthiness on the same rating scale. This assumption justifies time independent λk,j .
2The general informational asymmetry between firm owners and raters constitutes the cornerstone of modern corporate
finance (e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977; Berk and DeMarzo, 2007).
3This is in line with Duffie and Lando (2001) who build their model on a Merton-type log normal firm value process and
assume that the error in the observation of the log firm value is normal and additive.
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In order to estimate the consensus scores Si(t) we have to specify the underlying processes and
distributions of this framework. We specify the development of the firm-specific changes mi(t) and the
latent market factor f(t) by AR(1) processes as
mi(t) = βimi(t− 1) + ωi(t), (4)
f(t) = γf(t− 1) + ξ(t). (5)
ωi(t) is a normal distributed error term with mean zero and a constant variance across time and firms,
and ξ(t) is a standard normal distributed error term. βi (|βi| < 1) and γ (|γ| < 1) reflect the dependence
on period t− 1 (inter-temporal correlation).
Rating deviation. We assume that the ǫij(t) are independent of the firms and their characteristics (in
particular, their creditworthiness itself) and that the general rating process does not change over time t
(see Hornik et al., 2010). Assuming that µj and σj denote the mean and standard deviation of the rating
deviations ǫij(t), respectively, the rating deviations ǫij(t) are given by
ǫij(t) = µj + σjZij(t), (6)
where Zij(t) is assumed to be independent standard normal distributed over i, j and t. Thus, the rating
deviation of each rater consists of a systematic bias µj which captures fundamental differences in rating
methodology and σj which accounts for the variability of the rating deviation due to, e.g., asymmetric
information. Our model therefore is able to distinguish and account for both of these types of rating
deviations4.
2.2 Benchmark model
In addition to the dynamic latent trait model, we define a na¨ıve benchmark approach and compare it
with our dynamic latent trait model. Being conservative, one could consider to take the companies’ worst
rating as the benchmark. This is inappropriate for two reasons. Firstly, such an approach disregards the
information contained in the other available rating sources. Secondly, from an economic point of view a
rated company must be convinced that its credit-quality lies somewhere between its ratings and is not
represented by the worst rating. Otherwise there would be little reason to obtain several ratings (Hsueh
and Kidwell, 1988). Hence, without accounting for any rater-specific differences in rating deviations, the
“mean” of the observed ratings could serve as a consensus benchmark.
Latent consensus score. Our benchmark model follows the idea that for any time t, the consensus
score Si(t) of a company is simply the mean over rating scores Sij(t). In doing so, we do not assume
any time-dependent process driving the development of Si(t), i.e., for any time t, Si(t) is independent of
Si(t− 1).
Rating deviations. For the rating deviations, we assume that there are no rater-specific deviation
terms µj and σj , but a constant standard deviation σ of the rating deviations between the raters. This
implies that all raters are weighted equally in the estimation process. Within our model framework the
relationship between consensus score Si(t) and the estimated scores Sij(t) is given for the benchmark
4Extensions of the consensus model could include a time varying rating error µ(t). Since we did not expect any systematic
changes in the rating process and of the rating scale over the observation period from any of the raters, constant µj and σj
are assumed over time. However, the specification of these parameters in a time varying way might be necessary in other
situations.
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model by
Sij(t) = Si(t) + σZij(t), (7)
with Zij(t) distributed as in the dynamic case.
For a discussion on deriving rater-specific biases and imprecisions based on the consensus estimated
using this benchmark model in a post-hoc approach see Appendix D. It is shown that in the presence of
cases, where ratings are not provided by all raters, this approach leads to biased estimates.
3 Data
Ordinal ratings of the iTraxx Europe companies. We use historical long-term issuer ratings of
the constituents of the iTraxx Europe index (Series 10) from February 2007 to January 2009 provided by
the big three external rating agencies Standard&Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s. The iTraxx Europe index
series consists of the 125 most-liquid credit default swaps (CDS) referencing European investment-grade
entities and a new series is determined by dealer liquidity poll every six months. Most of the 125 entities
in the index are large multinationals and have traded equity. We choose the iTraxx Europe index because
it forms a representative contingent of the overall European credit derivative market and its constituents
have a high number of co-ratings (occurrences of ratings of a single firm by two different raters) from the
big three rating agencies. The time series is constructed using historical ordinal rating announcements
taken from Reuters Credit Views. We exclude all companies for which we do not have rating information
of at least two agencies for the complete time period, i.e., those with withdrawn ratings and entities
which acquire a rating for the first time within the selected time frame. This process yields a sample
of 5616 monthly ratings for 95 companies over 24 months (February 2007 to January 2009). Table 1
shows the co-ratings structure of the three raters. The average number of ratings for each firm per month
is 2.46.
Fitch Moody’s S&P
Fitch 88 44 88
Moody’s 44 51 51
S&P 88 51 95
Table 1: Co-ratings structure for 95 out of the 125 iTraxx Europe (Series 10) companies of the big three
external rating agencies Fitch, Moody’s and Standard&Poor’s (S&P).
As described in Section 1, the three rating agencies use different rating systems. Moody’s rating
system for global corporates contains 20 non-default rating categories, ranging from Aaa to C and is so
in the near default ratings more granular than the rating systems of Fitch and Standard&Poor’s (Emery
and Ou, 2009). These two agencies assign 17 non-default rating categories (AAA to CCC/C) to global
corporates (Needham and Verde, 2009; Vazza et al., 2009). Table 2 shows the number of ratings (per
rating category and rater) of the monthly ratings from February 2007 to January 2009 for the rating
agencies Fitch, Moody’s and Standard&Poor’s. According to the three rating distributions, only one firm
is once rated as a non-investment firm (ContinentalAG) and this only by Standard&Poor’s (see Crouhy
et al., 2001, for a description of investment grades and speculative grades). The distributions show also
that the granularity of the three rating systems is equal in the relevant segment of this rating data.
The rating history of 57 firms (60%) changed over the considered time period. Fitch changed the
ratings of 35 firms, where 29 firms were downgraded and 4 firms were upgraded. The remaining two
companies experienced a downgrade as well as an upgrade. Moody’s changed the ratings of 17 firms,
where 8 firms were downgraded and 8 firms were upgraded (the remaining company experienced two
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Fitch Moody’s S&P
Label # Label # Label #
1 AAA 6 Aaa 18 AAA 0
2 AA+ 85 Aa1 176 AA+ 45
3 AA 148 Aa2 41 AA 167
4 AA- 193 Aa3 54 AA- 233
5 A+ 226 A1 79 A+ 170
6 A 243 A2 153 A 251
7 A- 410 A3 225 A- 473
8 BBB+ 454 Baa1 231 BBB+ 576
9 BBB 315 Baa2 183 BBB 292
10 BBB- 30 Baa3 64 BBB- 72
11 BB+ 2 Ba1 0 BB+ 0
12 BB 0 Ba2 0 BB 1
13 worse 0 worse 0 worse 0
Table 2: Number of ratings (per rating category and rater) of the 95 out of the 125 iTraxx Europe
companies for the big three rating agencies Fitch, Moody’s and Standard&Poor’s (S&P).
upgrades as well as two downgrades). Standard&Poor’s changed the ratings of 45 firms, where 29 firms
were downgraded and 12 firms were upgraded (the remaining four company experienced upgrade(s) as
well as downgrade(s)). Hence, a clear tendency of downgrading is observable in this period.
According to Morgan (2002) we should find an excess of split ratings within financial and insurance
companies in our data. In fact, using the same mapping to a single numeric scale as Morgan (2002)
we observe 57.7% split ratings between S&P and Moody’s for the whole sample, but 80.3% when only
considering financial and insurance companies. The same pattern is true for Fitch and Moody’s with
56.9% for the whole sample and 88.3% for financial and insurance companies. The lowest split rate is
observed between S&P and Fitch with 38.8% overall split ratings and 55.6% for financial and insurance
companies.
In order to model the consensus ratings (Equation 2), each ordinal rating is identified with a numerical
interval reflecting the upper and lower bound of the creditworthiness on the real line (see Equation 1).
Here, we estimate the thresholds for the ordinal ratings using the empirical default rates (1990–2006)
provided by the external raters (Needham and Verde, 2009; Emery and Ou, 2009; Vazza et al., 2009). A
detailed description of this estimation is given in Appendix B.
Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50. By way of comparison we use the Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50 as
a representative market development of the iTraxx Europe portfolio from February 2007 to January 2009
(see Figure 2). The Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50 is the leading stock (price) index for the Eurozone
and covers 50 stocks from 12 Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. At January 2009, stocks of 30 out of
the 95 companies are contained in the EURO STOXX 50.
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4 Analysis of the big three rating agencies using their ratings
for the iTraxx Europe companies
4.1 Model estimation
Using the available ordinal ratings rij(t) for each company i = 1, . . . , 95 (out of the 125 iTraxx Europe
companies) and external rating agency j = {F,M, SP} from t = 1, . . . , 24 (February 2007 to January
2009) and the associated thresholds λj,k for k = 0, . . . ,Kj with KF = 17, KM = 20, and KSP = 17
we estimate the model parameters of our dynamic latent trait model as well as the parameters of our
benchmark model. For the estimation frequentist as well as Bayesian techniques can be used. E.g., Hornik
et al. (2010) estimated their model by standard maximum likelihood estimation. Here, we follow McNeil
and Wendin (2007) and Stefanescu et al. (2009) and choose a Bayesian estimation approach using Markov
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. Such an approach requires prior distributions to be chosen for the
parameter set. In order to minimize the influence of the prior distributions on the posterior distribution
we have specified non-informative priors for all our parameters.
In particular, we run four parallel Markov chains, each initialized with a different seed and a different
random number generator. The Gibbs sampler ran for 50, 000 iterations, using a thinning of 10 whereby
the first 5, 000 iterations were discarded as burn-in period. This yields 4, 500 draws from the posterior
for each parameter for each chain. Trace plots as well as the Geweke diagnostic and the Gelman Rubin’s
convergence diagnostic indicated satisfactory convergence (e.g., Gelman and Rubin, 1992; Plummer et al.,
2008).
Model selection. To take a decision in favour of one of the considered models is no trivial choice. Beside
the fit of the models, one should also bear in mind the complexity of the single models. Intuitively, if
two models fit the data equally well, the model with lower model complexity should be favored. In order
to compare our dynamic latent trait model with the benchmark model we follow Stefanescu et al. (2009)
and use the deviance information criterion (DIC; Spiegelhalter et al., 2002). DIC is in frequent use in
Bayesian hierarchical settings and it can easily be derived during the MCMC simulations (see Claeskens
and Hjort, 2008). The DIC is a generalization of the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) for hierarchical models and does not require nested models. In contrast to
the AIC and BIC, DIC allows to compare Bayesian hierarchical models where the effective number of
parameters is not clearly defined.
A lower DIC value indicates a better model fit. According to Spiegelhalter et al. (2002), if the difference
in DIC is greater than 10, then the model with the larger DIC value has considerably less support than
the model with the lower DIC value. For our models, the lower DIC value of our dynamic latent trait
model (DIC = 9577.49) indicates that this model dominates in the terms of model fit as well as model
complexity the na¨ıve benchmark model (DIC = 16399.92).
4.2 Results for the dynamic latent trait model
Rating deviations. We begin our analysis of the estimation results with the rating deviations. Our
dynamic latent trait model provides estimates for the rating bias µj and the standard deviation σj of the
rating deviation of the big three external rating agencies on the score scale. Table 3 shows the results
for the estimated posterior distribution of the parameters µj and σj for the three raters. The posterior
distributions of the parameters are characterized by the mean values (Mean) and the standard deviations
(SD) of the 18, 000 (4× 4, 500) posterior draws.
We infer from Table 3 that Fitch has the smallest absolute rating bias from the consensus on the score
scale with respect to the posterior mean (0.0157). Moody’s clearly seems to be too optimistic in its credit
assessment yielding a posterior mean for the rating bias µ of −0.089 on the score scale. Note, that our
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µj σj
Mean SD Mean SD
Fitch 0.0157 0.0018 0.0753 0.0021
Moody’s −0.0891 0.0024 0.1002 0.0028
S&P 0.0734 0.0017 0.0642 0.0018
Table 3: Estimated bias µj and standard deviations σj for the rating deviations (on the score scale)
of the big three external rating agencies Fitch, Moody’s and Standard&Poor’s (S&P). The posterior
distributions of the parameters are characterized by the mean values (Mean) and the standard deviations
(SD) of the 18, 000 (4× 4, 500) posterior draws.
model is based on the thresholds λj,k (and therefore PD equivalents) which are clearly lower for Moody’s
than the other two raters. Despite the high average difference between the investment grades (on the
score scale: 0.139) in the PD equivalents of Moody’s and Standard&Poor’s indicated in the Appendix
(see Table 8), Moody’s is still more optimistic when rating investment-grade firms than Standard&Poor’s.
In this study, Standard&Poor’s is with a posterior mean of the rating bias of 0.073 the most conservative
rater out of the three considered rating agencies.
In addition to the rating biases, our model captures the standard deviation (which is indirectly pro-
portional to the precision) of the rating deviations of the three raters (Table 3). Whereas the posterior
mean of the standard deviation σ of the rating deviations is rather similar for Fitch and Standard&Poor’s
(0.075, 0.064), Moody’s has a higher posterior mean of the standard deviation (0.100), indicating that its
ratings deviate more strongly from the consensus ratings.
Consensus score. In addition to the analysis of the bias/variance structure of the rating deviations,
we analyze the estimated consensus scores of our dynamic latent trait model. Instead of showing the
consensus scores of all iTraxx Europe companies, Figure 1 shows the estimated consensus rating scores of
four sample companies (ENELSPA, NESTLE, GLENCORE INT. AG, ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND)
and compares them with the original ratings (mapped onto the score scale) of the three raters Fitch,
Moody’s and Standard&Poor’s as well as with the mean rating scores of the three raters derived with
the benchmark model.
Due to the fact that the companies ENELSPA and NESTLE are rated by all three raters, the consensus
score (solid line) is very similar to the mean score (dashed line). In the case of the two other companies
GLENCORE INT. AG and ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND where for each company ratings of only two
raters are available, Figure 1 shows remarkable differences between the consensus and the mean score.
Due to rater specific deviation terms, our latent consensus score is able to incorporate the non-availability
of ratings.
A justification of the latent market f(t) in our framework can be found looking at the correlation
between its estimated values and an empirical benchmark market. In fact, the correlation between f(t)
and the Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50 index is −0.947. The negative sign is due to the estimation of f(t)
on the score scale. Additionally we can compare the trend of both markets, when looking at Figure 2
in the paper. E.g., both markets show the calm period around 2007–07 and the massive shocks by the
end of 2007. Even though the result is not surprising, it cannot be expected. The comparison of the two
serves as a post-modeling check and the similarity between these two enhances the face validity of our
proposed model.
Consensus rating. In addition to the analysis of the consensus scores, we can use the consensus ratings
derived by mapping the scores onto the raters’ rating scales to analyze the rating agreement of the raters.
An intuitive way for this is the Hit-Miss-Match (HMM) matrix which counts how many consensus
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Figure 1: Estimated consensus score (Consensus), the mean score from the benchmark model (Mean),
and the original ratings mapped onto the score scale of the big three external rating agencies Fitch (F),
Moody’s (M) and Standard&Poor’s (S).
ratings exactly match the ratings provided by a rater. Appendix A presents the HMM matrix for each
rater.
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Fitch 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.154 0.725 0.108 0.004 0.000
Moody’s 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.028 0.280 0.541 0.114 0.020
S&P 0.003 0.000 0.030 0.432 0.528 0.007 0.000 0.000
Table 4: Proportion of ratings per rating class deviation between the consensus ratings and the original
ratings provided by the big three rating agencies Fitch, Moody’s and Standard&Poor’s (S&P).
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Figure 2: Estimated latent market factor f(t) and the Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50 index over the full
time period (2007-02 to 2009-01).
Furthermore, we can compute the proportion of ratings for each rating deviation (measured in rating
notches) between the consensus ratings and the ratings provided by the raters. Table 4 shows that
Fitch’s ratings have a very high accordance (72.5%) with the estimated consensus ratings. According to
the estimated rating biases (see Table 3) Moody’s is rather more “optimistic” than the other raters. This
effect is also seen in Table 4. Only 28.0% of Moody’s ratings exactly hit the consensus rating. 84.9%
are within one rating notch and 67.5% are more optimistic, i.e., are at least one rating category better
than our estimated consensus rating. For Standard&Poor’s we obtain that 96.7% are within one rating
category in comparison to the consensus rating. In contrast to Fitch, Standard&Poor’s even has a few
ratings which are 4 rating classes below the estimated consensus rating.
5 Discussion
In this paper we investigate a new dynamic framework for aggregating credit-rating information in a
multi-rater set-up, i.e., in situations where ordinal ratings from different sources for the same firm are
available. In our model we assume that the raters do not directly estimate the ordinal ratings, but
they estimate a numerical variable – representing the creditworthiness of the firm – in an internal rating
process. We treat the true unobservable numerical variable of a firm as a latent variable and model its
dynamic by using systematic as well as idiosyncratic changes. In contrast to other methods, our model
class accounts for the fact that not all firms are rated by all raters at all time points in the data and
captures the panel structure of the data.
In addition to the solution for the aggregation problem, our model is useful in the validation of the
different sources. The analysis of the mean/variance structure of the rating deviations yields rater-specific
rating biases as well as the different imprecisions of the rating systems.
The suggested framework for modeling consensus of a multi-rater panel is very general and allows for
a variety of possible enhancements. We could aim at employing more flexible models for the distributions
of the rating scores and rating deviations, e.g., via suitable mixtures of normals. We could also allow more
flexibility in the specification of the factor loading α capturing the dependence between the latent scores
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and the latent market (see Equation 3) by using a firm- or industry-specific factor loading. In addition, it
would be interesting to allow for industry-specific parameters for the rating bias, the standard deviation
of the rating deviation and the long-term mean (see Hornik et al., 2010). We could also try to use an
external market factor (e.g., the Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50) instead of a latent market factor to
describe the systematic changes of the latent scores. The use of Bayesian estimation techniques allows
very flexible specification of models, so that we intend to explore these possible enhancements in our
future research.
By using the ratings for the iTraxx Europe companies (Series 10) provided by the big three rating
agencies Fitch, Moody’s and Standard&Poor’s we compute a more informative rating, the consensus
rating for each company, and show that there are remarkable differences in the rating behavior and
rating systems of the three raters. In particular, we infer from our results, that Moody’s is the most
favorable and Standard&Poor’s the most pessimistic rater.
Computational details
All computations were carried out in the R system (version 2.15.1) for statistical computing (R Develop-
ment Core Team, 2009). In particular, the R package rjags (Plummer, 2009) was used for Gibbs sampling
and model selection, and the R package coda (Plummer et al., 2008) was used for the output diagnostic.
A Hit-Miss-Match matrices for the raters
Consensus rating Fitch rating
AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+
AAA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AA+ 0 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AA 6 52 124 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AA- 0 0 21 157 44 14 0 0 0 0 0
A+ 0 0 3 19 149 50 0 0 0 0 0
A 0 0 0 0 33 166 33 0 0 0 0
A- 0 0 0 0 0 13 309 82 3 0 0
BBB+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 68 350 93 0 0
BBB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 218 4 0
BBB- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 26 2
BB+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5: Hit-Miss-Match matrix between the estimated consensus ratings and the ratings provided by
Fitch, measured on the Fitch rating scale.
In Table 5 most ratings are on the main diagonal or one rating notch below or above indicating a
high agreement between Fitch’s ratings and the consensus ratings. Table 6 shows that Moody’s ratings
are rather one or more rating notches below the consensus ratings, confirming the negative rating bias
shown in Table 3. In contrast to Moody’s ratings, Standard&Poor’s ratings are rather one or more rating
notches above the consensus ratings (see Table 7), confirming the positive rating bias shown in Table 3.
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Consensus rating Moody’s rating
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1
Aaa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aa1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aa2 10 80 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aa3 7 96 31 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A1 0 0 3 16 33 24 0 0 0 0 0
A2 0 0 0 33 19 3 0 0 0 0 0
A3 0 0 0 0 3 126 74 0 0 0 0
Baa1 0 0 0 0 24 0 149 77 4 20 0
Baa2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 154 101 4 0
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 77 40 0
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Table 6: Hit-Miss-Match matrix between the estimated consensus ratings and the ratings provided by
Moody’s, measured on the Moody’s rating scale.
Consensus rating Standard&Poor’s rating
AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB
AAA 0 43 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AA+ 0 2 93 7 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0
AA 0 0 28 137 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AA- 0 0 0 89 109 9 0 0 0 0 0 0
A+ 0 0 0 0 58 121 2 0 0 0 0 0
A 0 0 0 0 0 99 159 0 0 0 0 0
A- 0 0 0 0 0 16 311 185 0 0 0 0
BBB+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 391 91 0 0 0
BBB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 201 47 0 0
BBB- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 1
BB+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 7: Hit-Miss-Match matrix between the estimated consensus ratings and the ratings provided by
Standard&Poor’s, measured on the Standard&Poor’s rating scale.
B Estimation of the rating thresholds
In order to map the ordinal ratings provided by the three external rating agencies to PD ratings (PD
equivalents) we follow the approach proposed by Neagu et al. (2009). They relate empirical PDs to ratings
on an appropriate score scale. The score variable represents a rank ordering of risk of default over some
future time horizon (we use a one year future time period). The task is to find a transformation of the
score variable into an empirical PD. In other words, this method aims at finding a function F such that:
PD = F (score),
which can be written by using a default indicator as:
Prob(default indicator = 1) = F (score)
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and gives the base formulation for the class of binary response models. Different types of models, utilizing
different forms for the function F , can be fit. Neagu et al. (2009) suggest to try the three most commonly
used binary response models: logit, probit, and complementary log-log (CLL) models. These models can
be applied directly to the score data, but in real-world applications the score data tends to exhibit a high
degree of skewness. In this case it is recommended that a transformation of the score variable is made:
a Box-Cox power transformation (Box and Cox, 1964) or a Box-Tidwell transformation (Granger and
Newbold, 1977).
In particular, we use the published historical empirical global corporate default rates of the three
external rating agencies from 1990 to 2006 (Emery and Ou, 2009; Needham and Verde, 2009; Vazza et al.,
2009). In order to yield one-year empirical default rates we compute the averages over this time period.
We then fit all combinations of binary response models (probit, logit, and CLL) and transformations
(Box-Cox power and Box-Tidwell) to the average default rates. A probit score model with Box-Tidwell
transformation is selected as the best method according to the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic (Hosmer and
Lemeshow, 2000).
In order to cleave to the ordinal structure of ratings, thresholds for the mapping PDs derived from the
empirical default rates have to be computed. We compute the thresholds by the means of two adjacent
mapping PDs on the logit scale for each rater j. I.e., the upper threshold λk of rating class k = 1, . . . ,Kj−1
of rater j is given by λk = 1/2(logit(PDk+1) + logit(PDk)) and the “lower” threshold of the best rating
class is −∞ and the “upper” threshold of the worst rating class is +∞ (Altman and Rijken, 2004).
Table 8 shows the estimated rating thresholdsfor the three different rating systems of Fitch, Moody’s,
and Standard & Poor’s using the empirical default rates from 1990 to 2006. Note, that the rating system
of Moody’s is finer on the upper side, i.e., assigning four more rating grades to the high PD segment
than the other two raters. Whereas the empirical default rates and the PD mappings of Fitch and
Standard&Poor’s seem to be rather similar, Moody’s empirical default rates is clearly below the other
two. E.g., on average the difference on the probit scale between the investment grades of Standard&Poor’s
and Moody’s is 0.139.
Moody’s scale Moody’s score Fitch / S&P scale Fitch score S&P score
Aa1 −3.8461 AA+ −3.8388 −3.7372
Aa2 −3.7859 AA −3.7601 −3.6768
Aa3 −3.7063 AA- −3.6621 −3.5951
A1 −3.6097 A+ −3.5479 −3.4940
A2 −3.4974 A −3.4194 −3.3748
A3 −3.3703 A- −3.2779 −3.2385
Baa1 −3.2295 BBB+ −3.1245 −3.0857
Baa2 −3.0754 BBB −2.9599 −2.9172
Baa3 −2.9086 BBB- −2.7849 −2.7334
Ba1 −2.7296 BB+ −2.5998 −2.5348
Ba2 −2.5388 BB −2.4053 −2.3217
Ba3 −2.3365 BB- −2.2017 −2.0946
B1 −2.1230 B+ −1.9893 −1.8536
B2 −1.8986 B −1.7685 −1.5991
B3 −1.6636 B- −1.5395 −1.3311
Caa1 −1.4180 CCC/C −1.3025 −1.0500
Caa2 −1.1621
Caa3 −0.8961
Ca/C −0.6200
Table 8: Estimated class boundaries λk,j for the three raters on the score scale based on a probit score
model with Box-Tidwell transformation using the empirical default rates from 1990 to 2006.
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C Summary of parameter estimates
For the factor loading α we derive a posterior mean of 0.0094. Analogously, the posterior mean of the
AR(1) coefficient of the latent market factor γ is 0.8560. This indicates that the estimated latent market
factor is highly persistent. Different AR(1) coefficients βi are estimated for each single firm for the
idiosyncratic changes mi(t) and the posterior mean values vary between 0.070 and 0.9936. The mean of
the posterior mean values of βi is equal to 0.3169 and a standard deviation of 0.3188 is observed. For the
individual firms the differences in persistence are hence large varying from only a small dependence to a
very high dependence.
D Deriving rater-specific biases and imprecisions from the na¨ıve
benchmark
The relationship between the “observed” scores Sij(t) and the consensus score Si(t) is given by
Sij(t) = Si(t) + µj + σjZij(t). (8)
For the na¨ıve benchmark model this relationship is simplified to
Sij(t) = Si(t) + σZij(t) (9)
and the consensus can be estimated in this case by
S˜i(t) =
1∑J
j=1 δij(t)
J∑
j=1
δij(t)Sij(t), (10)
where J is the number of raters and δij(t) is a binary indicator which is 1 if rater j rates firm i at time
point t and 0 otherwise.
Based on these consensus estimates the systematic errors of the single raters µj can be estimated in
a post-hoc approach using
µ˜j =
1∑I
i=1
∑T
t=1 δij(t)
I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
δij(t)
(
Sij(t)− S˜i(t)
)
. (11)
T denotes the number of time points and I the number of firms. These estimates are then transformed
in order to ensure that they sum to zero.
In similar vein we can estimate the imprecisions of the single raters σ2j :
σ˜2j =
1∑I
i=1
∑T
t=1 δij(t)− IT − 1
I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
δij(t)
(
Sij(t)− S˜i(t)− µ˜j
)2
. (12)
Finally, we derive the bias of the estimator µ˜j by determining its expected value E[µ˜j ].
E[µ˜j ] = µj −
1∑I
i=1
∑T
t=1 δij(t)
J∑
k=1
I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
δik(t)δij(t)∑J
l=1 δil(t)
µk. (13)
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The second term,
1∑I
i=1
∑T
t=1 δij(t)
J∑
k=1
I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
δik(t)δij(t)∑J
l=1 δil(t)
µk, (14)
is the bias of the estimate for the systematic error µj in the na¨ıve benchmark model which becomes
relevant if the data includes unbalanced repetition patterns, i.e., not all firms are rated by all raters at
all time points. Otherwise, if δij(t) ≡ 1, the term becomes (1/TI)
∑J
j=1(TI/J)µj = (1/J)
∑J
j=1 µj = 0.
Unbiased estimates could be obtained by correcting the estimate by the term given in Equation (14).
Essentially, our proposed consensus model takes the cases which did not receive ratings from all raters
into account and avoids this bias.
Using our dataset and the above presented estimation techniques, we estimated the bias of rating
errors µj to range from −0.0164 to 0.0086. In economic terms this implies an average mis-estimation of
PDs up to 15 bps for lower credit quality firms. Additionally we observe that the resulting ratings differ
by at least one rating notch in 17%− 23% of the cases.
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